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Danielle Pinard The Constituents of
Democracy
The Individual in the Work of
Madame Justice Wilson*
Introduction*
Judge Bertha Wilson was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada
in March 1982. She was the first woman to be appointed to that Court.
I am thrilled to have the opportunity to participate in this symposium
in her honour.
The overall theme of the event is the contribution of Madame
Justice Bertha Wilson to the Democratic Intellect. Within that theme,
I shall try more particularly to delineate her conception of the indi-
vidual as a constituent of the democracy, as found in her work at the
Supreme Court of Canada. Such a task is an arduous one and it would
be far from me to pretend that I have accomplished it without fail. In
other words, it is not my intention to give you an exhaustive, rigorous
and detailed analysis of her entire intellectual work spanning ten
years. Nor will I give you a vision of the important role Judge Wilson
played as regards Canadian substantive law. I will confine myself to a
more humble goal.
I shall attempt to share with you the impression I have of Judge
Wilson's conception of the individual. I will try to present a general
view of what occurred to me as I went through the opinions she wrote
while at the Supreme Court of Canada, alone or with the assent of her
colleagues, dissenting or in agreement with the majority.' I shall try to
put together, as honestly as possible, what she explicitly said on the
subject in question.
* Danielle Pinard, Professor, Facult6 do droit, Universite de Montr6al
* I would like to thank my colleagues Stephen Perry from the Faculty of Law of McGill
University and Jean Leclair from the Facult6 de dmit de L'Universit6 de Montrd for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
1. I was skeptical about a commonly-held belief to the effect that Judge Wilson was "always"
writing dissenting opinions. I made a rough statistical analysis of the cases in which she wrote
opinions. It would seem that she wrote twice as many majority judgments as dissenting
opinions. Moreover, she wrote far more opinions with which other judges concurred than
opinions written alone. Therefore her reputation of a dissenting loner, at first sight, seems
undeserved. Could it be because of prejudices? Could it be similar to the prejudice to the effect
that women talk more than men, even though statistical evidence would tend to show quite the
contrary? See Dale SPENDER, Man Made Language, 2nd edition, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1985, p. 41.
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I hope she won't stand up and say I'm wrong. I admit from the
outset that it's an impressionist work I am presenting here. My paper
is really about the way I see her work.
After a few words about what I understand to be her general
contextual approach, I will address Judge Wilson's conception of the
individual within a social context. It will include comments on her
vision of individual dignity and liberty, on the necessary state inter-
vention and unavoidable burdens thereby created, on the role of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 and on the duty of the
state to respect human dignity and to treat the individual with justice.
I shall then address her conception of a gendered individual and,
finally, some other characteristics she seems to see in individuals.
I. A Contextual Approach
Before directly addressing Judge Wilson's conception of the indi-
vidual, it seemed to me essential to first and briefly consider her
general approach to law, which obviously influenced the elaboration
of the former.
In a controversial speech entitled "Will Women Judges Really
Make a Difference?", now published in the Osgoode Hall Law Re-
view3, Judge Wilson considered the possible impact on law of the new
presence of women in the judiciary. In the course of that speech, she
presented the work of Carol Gilligan, who has developed a theory that
women have a different way of being, of approaching life and of
elaborating moral judgments, i.e. women speak in "A Different Voice".4
I said and wrote elsewhere that I had serious reservations about that
difference theory.5 Essentially, along with Catharine Mackinnon, I
am afraid that it could be the "velvet glove on the iron fist of domina-
tion".6  But that is not the point here. What I want to address
particularly is the hypothesis developed by Judge Wilson that one
manifestation of that different voice could be that women judges
2. Part of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, (U.K.) 1982, c. 11,
hereinafter:, the Charier.
3. Wilsonjdg Bertha, "Will Women Judges Really Make A Difference?" (1990). 28 Osgoode
Hall LI. 705.
4. Gilligan, Carol, In a Different Voice, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
5. Pinard, Danielle, "Le Language et L'interpr6tation des lois: au masculin seulement?", to be
published in Thmis.
6. Mackinnon, Catherine A., Feminism Unmod'fied, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1987), p..
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would be more sensitive to a contextual approach to law than to
abstract formalism. 7 I don't know about other women judges, and I
don't know if it is by reason of a different voice, but Judge Wilson
surely advocated for a more contextual approach to law. Her ap-
proach to the Charter and to criminal law will serve here to illustrate
that general attitude.
From the outset, she clearly adopted an empirical approach to
Charter adjudication. Indeed, as early as the Big M Drug Mart case,8
concerning freedom of religion, she affirmed that the Charter was an
effect-oriented document and that, therefore, the crucial step in Char-
ter cases was the search for empirical effects alleged to be in violation
of Charter rights. That particular opinion was not subscribed to by
any ot er member of the Court. But her opinion turned out to be
correct, as confirmed by subsequent decisions that adopted this ap-
proach.9
Similarly, in the Edmonton Journal case,'0 a decision respecting
freedom of expression and freedom of the press, Judge Wilson explic-
itly confirmed her preference for a contextual approach to Charter
interpretation, an approach that allows the taking into account of the
particular context, and therefore, the particular values at stake in a
case. She explains :
One virtue of the contextual approach, it seems to me, is that it recog-
nizes that a particular right or freedom may have a different value
depending on the context. It may be, for example, that freedom of
expression has greater value in a political context than it does in the
context of disclosure of the details of a matrimonial dispute. The
contextual approach attempts to bring into sharp relief the aspect of the
right or freedom which is truly at stake in the case as well as the
relevant aspects of any values in competition with it. It seems to be
more sensitive to the reality of the dilemma posed by the particular
facts and therefore more conducive to finding a fair and just compro-
mise between the two competing values under s.1.11
That is consistent with views she had expressed earlier, writing
generally about statutory interpretation. She had then written:
7. Wilson, supra, note 3, p. 520-521.
8. R. v. Big M. Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
9. Indeed, it seems that most subsequent Supreme Court judgements approached the Charter as
an "effect-oriented document".
10. Edmonton Journal v. Alberta, A.G. [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326.
11. Idem, p. 1355-1356.
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... the Court must determine the content of Charter rights ... in the
context of the real life situations brought to the Court by the litigants
and on the basis of empirical data rather than on the basis of some
abstraction.12
More precisely, as regards the limitation clause of the Charter, she
has long been advocating for better factual information brought to the
courts by the litigants. For the kind of balancing analysis required by
section one, judges must be made aware of the legislative as well as
the adjudicative facts,13  If litigants fail to bring them the proper
information, she said, judges simply won't be able to transcend the
limits of their ego, but they will still make judgments.'4
That contextual approach is obvious as well in applications of that
limitation clause where she often emphasized the importance of con-
sidering the particular circumstances. In McKinney,15 for example, the
recent case conceming mandatory retirement for university profes-
sors, discussing possible limits to equality rights, she expressed the
view that the judicial treatment of the "resources argument" made by
the state should each time be approached in the particular context of
the case. It could be, she wrote, that courts should show more judicial
restraint where the legislature has attempted a fair distribution of
resources in a context of competing constitutional claims. 6
In Chaulk,17 where the constitutionality of the insanity provisions
of the Criminal Code was questioned on the basis of the presumption
12. Wilson, Judge Bertha, "Statutory Interpretation - The Use of Extrinsic Aids", a paper
presented in April 1990, at the 9h Commonwealth Law Conference, in New Zealand, p. 14.
13. See Pinard, Danielle, "Le droit et le fait dans 'application des standards et la clause
limitative de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertds" (1989), 30 C. de D. 137, p. 169.
14. After having underlined the need for solid factual underpinnings regarding problems of
proof in Charter cases, she wrote: "Otherwise the judges will be unable, as Judge Cardozo put
it, to transcend the limitations of their own egos and will tend to rely upon their own personal
value systems interpreting and applying the Charter...", Judge Bertha Wilson, paper presented at
the University of Toronto, November 1985, quoted in Manning, M., "Proof of Facts in
Constitutional Cases", in Beaudoin, G.A., Causes invoquant la Charte 1986-1987, (ditions
yvon Blais, 1987), p. 2 7 1.
15. McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.
16. "On the other hand, there may be circumstances in which other factors militate against
interference by the courts where the legislature has attempted a fair distribution of resources. For
example, courts should probably not intervene where competing constitutional claims to fixed.
resources are at stake. The allocation of resources ought not, in other words, to be approached in
a contextual manner. It should always be open to the Court to examine the government's
reasons for making the particular allocation and to measure those reasons against the values
enshrined in the constitution." Idenm, p. 404. In the same vein, in United States v. Cotroni,
[1989] S.C.R. 1469, she made clear that her section one analysis was clearly grounded on the
particular facts of the case (p. 1509).
17. R. v. Chaulk, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1303.
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of innocence, she denounced, in principle, the attempt to justify limits
imposed on constitutional rights on the mere ground that hypothetical
evils would be thereby remedied. 8
In the definition of constitutional rights as well, she preferred a
contextual approach and refused abstract formal reasoning. For exam-
ple, in Hess and Nguyen, 19 a case conceming the constitutionality of a
Criminal Code provision prohibiting a defined sexual conduct, she
wrote an interesting opinion in which she warned against any kind of
rigid formalism in the interpretation of equality rights guaranteed by
the Charter. Indeed, she made the point, in a context of sexual of-
fences, that for the legislation to create an offence which, as a matter
of fact, could only be committed by persons of one sex, did not
automatically raise a section 15 issue of equality rights.20
In my view we are therefore dealing with an offence that involves an
act that as a matter of biological fact only men over a certain age are
capable of committing and given that only men may be penetrators, it is
as absurd to suggest that the provision discriminates against males
because it does not include women in the category of potential offend-
ers as it is to suggest that a provision that prohibits self-induced
abortion is discriminatory because it does not include men among the
potential class of offenders.2
However, she made it clear that it was always a matter of context,
and warned against the risk of perpetuating discrimination in the name
of alleged sex-related distinctions.22
Her concem with concrete particular circumstances, as opposed to
abstract formal principles, is obvious, as well, in her approach to
individuals accused of criminal offences. Two examples will illus-
trate this point.
18. As regards the hypothesis that it was "necessary to impose a burden on the accused to prove
his insanity on a balance of probabilities in order to prevent perfectly sane persons who had
committed crimes from escaping criminal liability on tenuous insanity pleas" (p. 8), she wrote:
"The question posed by the Chief Justice's approach, it seems to me, is therefore whether s.
16(4) of the Code can be justified under s. 1 as a prophylactic measure designed to fend off a
hypothetical social problem that might arise if accused persons pleading insanity had to meet
only an evidentiary burden. This prompts me to ask: do we wish to go down this path and justify
infringements of guaranteed Charter rights on a purely hypotheticalbasis? Andinparticular, do
we wish to go down this path where such a fundamental tenet of our justice system as the
presumption of innocence is at stake? I have serious reservations about adopting such a course
even in cases where it could be said that the hypothesis was a strong one which I do not think it
is in this instance for reasons which I will discuss." Iderm, manuscript, p. 12.
19. R. v. Hess and Nguyen, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906.
20. ldem, p. 929.
21. Idem, p. 930.
22. Idem, p. 928.
86 The Dalhousie Law Journal
In Hill,2 a criminal law case, she wrote an important dissenting
opinion in which she tried to make sense of the objective standard that
one finds in the provocation defence of the Criminal Code"' [i.e. that
the provocation be "of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an
ordinary person of the power of self-control"] by putting it within a
particular fact setting. Indeed, she did not want to transform the
objective standard into a subjective one. Rather, and more simply, she
wanted the objective standard to make sense, considering the reality
that provocation never occurs in a vacuum. It always happens in a
particular fact setting, the knowledge of which is essential to under-
stand and evaluate whether an "ordinary person" would have been
deprived of her power of self-control.
[...] an insulting remark or gesture has to be placed in context before the
extent of its provocativeness can be realistically assessed.'
She therefore would have considered the accused's attributes "for
the purpose of putting the insult into context and assessing its grav-
ity.9 6
The Lavallie case27 can be understood as coming within the same
philosophical approach. One recalls that, in that case, Judge Wilson
wrote that the inner and particular complexity of relationships involv-
ing domestic violence was such that, in a criminal case where a
battered woman relied on self-defence, the determination of this de-
fence became a subject-matter for expert witnesses. Ordinary lay
people could too easily be overcome by common prejudices. So, once
again, Judge Wilson refused to be caught in abstract and formal
principles, and advocated for legal responses adapted to particular
social contexts.
If it strains credulity to imagine what the "ordinary man" would do in
the position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men do not
typically find themselves in that situation. Some women do, however.
The definition of what is reasonable must be adapted to circumstances
which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhabited by the hypo-
thetical "reasonable man".?
23. R. v. Hill, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313.
24. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 215.
25. R. v. Hill, supra, note 23, pp. 345-346.
26. Idem, pp. 346-347.
27. R. v. Lavallie, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852.
28. Idem, p. 874.
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The contextual approach to law advocated for by Judge Wilson
determined her conception of the individual. Neither can a question of
law be isolated from the particular factual setting in which it arises,
nor can the understanding of the individual be accomplished without
the light of a social environment.
11. A Free and Autonomous Individual Living Within a Particular
Social Context
In a mainer consistent with her global views of the world and of the
law, Judge Wilson analyzes, and believes in, a free and autonomous
individual who lives, however, in a societal context. Let me explain.
More than once, in her work, Judge Wilson affirmed the importance,
the centrality of the individual, of her dignity and of her liberty.
However, it seems to me, she did not forget the constant pervasiveness
of social contextuality : her free and dignified individual does not live
alone on a desert isle, she lives in a community that made her who she
is, that constantly models and changes her but over which she still
retains some control.
In certain areas of life, liberty will require the state not to interfere
with individual choices. In others, however, genuine freedom will rest
on the state intervention protecting individuals against threats caused
by others.
1. Assertion of Individual Dignity and Liberty
Mostly within the context of some discussion of the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms, Judge Wilson has stressed the importance
of individual liberty and dignity. One finds, in that part of her work,
the expression of the fundamental liberal point of view that the indi-
vidual must have the liberty to be the real author of, her life, and to
determine the course of her life in accordance with her own concep-
tion of what is a good life.
In the Jones case", an early Charter case concerned with freedom
of religion, Judge Wilson, after having reminded us that the liberty
guaranteed by the Charter meant "liberty as understood and enjoyed
in a free and democratic society" 3 , defined "liberty" in the following
terms:
I believe that the framers of the Constitution in guaranteeing "liberty"
as a fundamental value in a free and democratic society had in mind the
29. Jones v. R. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284.
30. Idem, p. 318-319.
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freedom of the individual to develop and realize his potential to the full,
to plan his own life to suit his own character, to make his own choices
for good or ill, to be non-conformist, idiosyncratic and even eccen-
tric - to be, in to-day's parlance, "his own person" and accountable as
such. John Stuart Mill described it as "pursuing our own good in our
own way". This, he believed, we should be free to do "so long as we do
not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain
it".31
But it is really in the Morgentaler case r discussing the constitu-
tionality of the Criminal Code provisions criminalizing abortion, that
she expanded on her views on the liberty of the individual.
She affirmed therein that the right to liberty guaranteed by the
Charter was inextricably tied to the concept of human dignity.33
Along with Neil MacCormick, she shared the classical liberal view
that "the ability to pursue one's own conception of a full and reward-
ing life"3M was an important element of liberty. She also agreed with
the point made by Dickson C.J. (as he then was) in R. v. Big M Drug
Mart,' to the effect that respect for "the ability of each citizen to make
free and informed decisions" was central to our democratic political
tradition. With Dickson C.J. (as he then was) she considered as well
that respect for the inherent dignity of the human person was a value
essential to a free and democratic society.3
She analyzed many of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Charter as expressions of the basic value of human dignity. For
example, she considered the right to choose one's own religion and
one's own philosophy of life, and the right to free speech and free
association, as united by a common concern for the idea of human
dignity.3
31. Idem.
32. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
33. Idem, p. 164.
34. Idem, p. 164, quoting Neil MacCormack Legal Right and Social Democracy: Essays in
Legal and Political Philosophy, (1982), p. 39.
35. Supra, note 8.
36. Idem, p. 346.
37. Morgentaler, supranote 32, p. 165, quoting Dickson CJ.'s opinion (as he then was) in R. v.
Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at p. 136.
38. "The idea of human dignity finds expression in almost every right and freedom guaranteed
in the Charter. Individuals are afforded the right to choose their own religion and their own
philosophy of life, the right to choose with whom they will associate and how they will express
themselves, the right to choose where they will live and what occupation they will pursuel"
Morgentaler, supra, note 32, p. 166.
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She considered "the right to make fundamental personal decisions
without interference from the state" 39 to be "a critical component of
the right to liberty".4 She wrote:
[...I the right to liberty contained in s. 7 guarantees to every individual
a degree of personal autonomy over important decisions intimately
affecting their private lives.4
Amongst those fundamental personal decisions, of course, she
included the decision of a woman to pursue or not a pregnancy.42
Judge Wilson linked that decision to the notion of privacy. It is a
theme she addressed in other opinions she wrote, always concerned
with the necessary protection of privacy against state violation. For
example, in Thompson Newspaper,43 she wrote that the historical
origins of the rights against compellability and self-incrimination
expressed a concern for the necessary respect, by the state, for the
privacy and personal autonomy and dignity of the individual. 4
Still in the Morgentaler case, emphasizing that the Criminal Code
provisions not only violated the liberty of pregnant women, but that
they infringed as well upon women's right to security, she denounced
the fact that by these provisions a woman was treated as "a means to
an end which she does not desire but over which she has no control".45
She added:
39. Iden, p. 166.
40. Idem, p. 171.
41. Idem.
42. "The question then becomes whether the decision of the woman to terminate her pregnancy
falls within this class of protected decisions. I have no doubt that it does. This decision is one
that will have profound psychological, economic and social consequences for the pregnant
woman. The circumstances giving rise to it can be complex and varied and there may be, and
usually are, powerful considerations militating in opposite directions. It is a decision that deeply
reflects the way the woman thinks about herself and her relationship to others and to society at
large. It is not just a medical decision; it is a profound social and ethical one as well. Her
response to it will be the response of the whole person."Idem.
43. Thompson Newspaper v. Dir. des enquites et recherches, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425.
44. "Having reviewed the historical origins of the rights against conapellability and self-
incrimination and the policy justifications advanced in favour of their retention in more modem
times, I conclude that their preservation is prompted by a concern that the privacy and personal
autonomy and dignity of the individual be respected by the state. The state must have some
justification for interfering with the individual and cannot rely on the individual to produce the
justification out of his own mouth. Were it otherwise, our justice system would be on slippery
slope towards the creation of a police state." Idem, p. 480. She expressed a similar concern in
other cases as well. See, for example: R. v. Chesson, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 148, 169; R. v. Thompson,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 1111, 1158; Edmonton Journal v. Alta, A.G., supra, note 10, p. 1364.
45. Morgentaler, supra, note 32, p. 173-174.
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She is the passive recipient of a decision made by others as to whether
her body is to be used to nurture a new life. Can there be anything that
comports less with human dignity and self-respect? How can a woman
in this position have any sense of security with respect to her person?"
In a later decision, the Prostitution case, 7 which discussed the
constitutionality of the Criminal Code provisions concerned with
prostitution, within the general affirmation of the importance of re-
spect for the individual's capacity to make choices, Judge Wilson
classified the negotiation for a sexual encounter, in the context of
prostitution, as a form of expression related to an economic choice,
and not less protected by the Charter than negotiation for the pur-
chase of a Van Gogh.8
It is interesting to note that she did so despite her evaluation "that
prostitution is [...] a degrading way for women to earn a living".4 9 As
prescribed by the classical liberal view, an individual should be free to
make her choices in accordance with her own conception of what is a
good life, and should not be compelled to endorse others' visions.
Judge Wilson's analysis of permissible limits to constitutional
rights is consistent with her deep respect for individual dignity. There-
fore, she won't allow the exercise of balancing individual interests and
collective preoccupations to be made within the definition of substan-
tive constitutional rights : if there are to be any limits imposed, they
must be justified through the process of a section one analysis.'
46. Idem.
47. Renvoi relatlfau Code criminel (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123.
48. "The provision prohibits persons from engaging in expression that has an economic purpose.
But economic choices are, in my view, for the citizen to make (provided that they are legally
open to him or her) and, whether the citizen is negotiating for the purchase of a Van Gogh or a
sexual encounter, 2.2(b) of the Charter protects that person's freedom to communicate with his
or her vendor." Idem, p. 1206.
49. Idem, p. 1210.
50. An important consequence of that approach is the imposition on the party seeking the
application of section one of the burden of proof as to the reasonableness of the limits to
constitutional rights and freedoms, and the applicability of the Oakes test. See, generally, for her
two-steps approach: R. v. Askov, [199012 S.C.R. 1199 at 1252-1253: "[ lbl...protects only the
accused's interest. If the government wishes to restrict the accused's right to a speedy trial for
societal reasons, e.g. on grounds of lack of institutional resources, it is free to do so through
appropriate legislation. Then a balancing of the societal and individual interests in speedy trials
will be carried out under s.1 of the Charter."; R. v. Hibert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151 at 190-191: "It
is accordingly inappropriate to qualify it [the right to silence] by balancing the interests of the
state against it orby applying it to the considerations relevant to the admissibility of evidence set
out in s.24(2) of Charter. [...] In deciding whether or not the authorities have offered fundamental
justice or not it is, in my view, essential to focus on the treatment of the accused and not on the
objective of the state. It would, in my view, be quite contrary to a purposive approach to the s.7
right to inject justificatory considerations for putting limits upon it into the ascertainment of its
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And even within a section one analysis, she won't allow adminis-
trative or policy convenience to justify infringements on constitutional
rights.51 These lights must be accommodated, and, in principle, the
costs for them must be absorbed by society.
So, for Judge Wilson, the dignity of the individual is fundamental.
It includes the liberty to make decisions, to live one's life in accord-
ance with one's values.
Some passages of Judge Wilson's work could be understood as
implying that the kind of liberty advocated for shows a crude version
of a negative conception of liberty; a liberty that can only exist on the
foundation of an absence of state. Within this version, governmental
action is essentially seen as a threat to individual liberty. One can
remember that in the Jones case 52, reported in 1985, she actually
defined the right to liberty as "the right to pursue one's goals free of
govenmental constraint". 3 Some of her comments in later decisions
seem to go in the same direction.
In the Morgentaler case 4, for instance, hasn't she proposed the
metaphor of the fence erected by the Charter around each individual,
and over which the state would not be allowed to trespass?55 Hasn't
she affirmed that "an aspect of the respect for human dignity on which
the Charter is founded is the right to make fundamental personal
decisions without interference from the state"5 , and that liberty, in a
free and democratic society, requires the state to respect the personal
decisions made by its citizens?57
Her analysis of the relationship between the individual and the
community is, however, more sophisticated than that.
Actually, beyond a possible first impression of blind acceptance of
pure individualism, one finds in Judge Wilson's work one preoccupa-
scope or content."; R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140 at 1165: "If there are to be limits on the
right to counsel other than the limit required for the safety of the police, i.e., if there are to be
qualifications put upon the words "without delay" in s. 10(b), then it seems to me that they must
be supported under s.l of the Charter."
51. See, for example: R. v. Chaulk, supra, note 17, p. 27-28; Stoffman v. Vancouver General
Hospital, [19901 3 S.C.R. 483, 554; McKinney v. University of Guelph, supra, note 15, p. 403;
Singh v. Minissre de 'enploi et de 'imnimgration, [1995 1 S.C.R. 177. Sme also, to the same
effect: Wilson, Judge Bertha, "The Making of a Constitution" (1988), 71 Judicature 334, p. 338.
52. Jones, supra, note 29.
53. Idem, p. 488.
54. Morgentaler, supra, note 32.
55. Idem, p. 164. See, to the same effect: Wilson, Judge Bertha, "The Making of a Constitution"
(1988), 71 Judicature 334, p. 338.
56. Idem, p. 166.
57. Idem.
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tion for the individual as a socially constructed being, and another for
the welfare of the community as a whole.
2. Necessary State Intervention
Wilson J.'s opinion, in the Morgentaler case, is the one in which one
finds by far the finest and strongest defense of an individual's, particu-
larly a woman's, liberty against state interference. It is, though, closely
linked to the particular issue that was discussed in that case, and it can,
unfortunately, create a false impression of Judge Wilson's views on
the individual living within a community. One must not forget that, in
that same Morgentaler case, she accepted the principle that, at some
point of development of the pregnancy, the state interest in the protec-
tion of the foetus may well supercede the right to liberty of the
woman, thereby allowing for legitimate state regulation.
In the recent case of McKinney v. University of Guelph8 , concern-
ing mandatory retirement for sixty five year old university professors,
Judge Wilson wrote an opinion in which her conception of freedom
and of the state is made clear. One finds in it, indeed, a critique of the
conception of freedom as defined in terms of absence of governmental
constraints. While individual liberty may sometimes require inaction
and passive respect on behalf of the state, its full blossom will often
rest, on the contrary, on the necessary creation, by the state, of proper
material conditions. Indeed, liberty may be primarily threatened by
individuals, private or corporate, and governmental action may then
be the only way to allow for an equal exercise and practice of liberty.
The state has therefore not only a passive role of respect for freedom,
but must as well act to promote it.
In McKinney, Judge Wilson made a historical review in which she
reminds us that "government regulation and intervention has long
been part of the political, social and economic culture of Canada
[...]"5, and that "it seems to be generally accepted by our historians
that the political philosophy of laissez-faire has not been embraced to
any substantial degree in Canada".' She added that "the phenomenon
of the interventionist state has traditionally been and continues to be a
feature of Canadian political life".6' She linked state intervention, in
Canada, to justice, equality, and real freedom:
58. McKinney, supra, note 15.
59. Idem, p. 355.
60. Idem.
61. Idem.
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Canadians recognize that government has traditionally had and contin-
ues to have an important role to play in the creation and preservation of
a just Canadian society. The state has been looked to and has re-
sponded to demands that Canadians be guaranteed adequate health
care, access to education and a minimum level of financial security to
name but a few examples. It is, in my view, untenable to suggest that
freedom is co-extensive with the absence of government. Experience
shows the contrary, that freedom has often required the intervention
and protection of government against private action.62
Therefore, she kept herself at a distance, in principle, from a
conception of an individual's liberty that implies non-interference by
the state. On the contrary, she admits that justice and freedom will
often require the state's intervention. This view, made explicit in
McKinney, was however already present in Judge Wilson's previous
work.
As early as the Operation Dismantle case63, in which, one remem-
bers, the constitutionality of the federal cabinet decision to authorize
the cruise missile testing was challenged on the ground of Charter
rights, Judge Wilson made clear that rights, including the right to
liberty, had to be understood in the context of inter-relations of indi-
viduals in society, and of the political reality of the modem state.
Indeed, as regards the inter-relations of individuals, she explained that
one person's rights had to accommodate the corresponding rights of
others", recalling the aphorism that "A hermit has no need of rights".'
Conceming the political reality of the modem state, she acknowledged
the fact that life in an organized state necessarily implied inescapable
limits to individual liberty.' In the context of that particular case, she
exemplified her thesis with the question of national defence policy,
the state sometimes having to create risk for its own population in
order to protect it against threats from potential foes. 7
At a more general level, she made, in Operation Dismantle, the
powerful affirmation that there was no liberty without law and no law
without some restriction of liberty.6
In the Jones case 69, as well, Judge Wilson reminded us of the limits
62. Idem, p. 356.
63. Operation Dismantle v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.
64. Idem, p. 488.
65. Idem.
66. Idem.
67. Idem, p. 489.
68. Idem.
69. Jones, supra, note 29.
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to individual freedom unavoidably intertwined with a life in a commu-
nity :
Of course, this freedom is not untrammelled. We do not live in
splendid isolation. We live in communities with other people.
Collectivity necessarily circumscribes individuality and the more com-
plex and sophisticated the collective structures become, the greater the
threat to individual liberty in the sense protected by s.7.7O
Judge Wilson does not define precisely the contours of individual
liberty within a community, but accepts the principle that there will be
cases where "individual liberty must yield to the collective authority
of the state. ' 7
Her concern about some state intervention, held to be necessary in
order to promote genuine liberty, that is sometimes threatened by
other individuals, shows that her view of political morality goes far
beyond a conception of liberty as mere lack of governmental con-
straint. A few cases will illustrate her views on the matter.
Judge Wilson acknowledged the necessity of state intervention in
order to protect the best interest of children. One knows that the "free
market" of personal relationships is one in which powerless children
often have to pay an important emotional price in the name of the
personal autonomy and the individual freedom of their parents. It thus
became widely accepted, by Judge Wilson included, that a policy of
legal intervention was required to protect the child's interests. In
Frame v. Smith72, a family law case, Judge Wilson acknowledged this
reality, admitting the justified policy of intervention by the law to
protect the child's best interests when a custodial parent denies access
to the other parent.73
In Racine v. Woods74, in the context of an adoption case, she
70. She added: "Section 7 does not spell out for us when individual liberty must yield to the
collective authority of the state. It does however, provide that no-one can be deprived of it
"except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice." Idem, p. 318-319.
71. Idem.
72. Frame v. Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99.
73. "Accordingly, the custodial parent who denies access to the other parent is sacrificing the
child's best interest as so found to his or her own selfish interests and this would appear, as a
general principle at least, to favour a policy of intervention by the law to protect the child's best
interests in such circumstances. This is not to deny that in specific cases that general policy of
intervention in order to uphold what has been found to be in the child's best interests may have
to yield to a greater threat to the child's interests arising from the fact of litigation by one parent
against the other. It is simply to say that the limits on any cause of action which the law might
recognize would have to be the result of a weighing of the positive against the negative factors
impacting on the children." Idem, p. 121-122.
74. Racine v. Woods, 11983] 2 S.C.R. 173.
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admitted that, considering the fact that parents may be blinded by their
own self interest, the legislature was justified in providing for the
possibility of dispensing with the consent of the biological parent on a
defacto adoption.75
Judge Wilson has been sensitive, as well, to some injustices caused
by matrimonial relationships, thereby justifying some corrective state
intervention. At the material level, for example, her opinion in Clarke
v. Clarke76 shows a concern for a necessary state adjustment of inequi-
ties between individual spouses, particularly as regards economic
contributions made by women.n
Other inequalities, products of the free market, were held by Judge
Wilson to deserve some state intervention. For example, in R. v.
Horseman8, discussing an Indian treaty, she was concerned with the
inequality of the bargaining power that prevailed at the time of the
agreement. She therefore advocated for a judicial interpretation of the
treaty that would be sensible to that inequality and that would some-
how try to remedy it. She wrote:
In other words, to put it simply, Indian treaties must be given the effect
the signatories obviously intended them to have at the time they were
entered into even if they do not comply with to-day's formal require-
ment. Nor should they be undermined by the application of the inter-
pretive rules we apply to-day to contracts entered into by parties of
equal bargaining power.79
In Rothfield v. Manolakos", a tort case, Judge Wilson seriously
took into account the inexperience and lack of power of property
75. "In giving the court power to dispense with the consent of the parent on a de facto adoption
the legislature has recognized an aspect of the human condition - that our own self interest
sometimes clouds our perception of what is best for those for whom we are responsible. It takes
a very high degree of selflessness and maturity - for most of us probably an unattainable degree
- for a parent to acknowledge that it might be better for his or her child to be brought up by
someone else. The legislature in its wisdom has protected the child against this human frailty in
a case where others have stepped into the breach and provided a happy and secure home for the
child for minimum period of three consecutive years. In effect, these persons have assumed the
obligations of the natural parents and taken their place. The natural parents' consent in these
circumstances is no longer required." Ident, p. 185.
76. Clarke v. Clarke, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 795.
77. "The Act is accordingly remedial in nature. It was designed to alleviate the inequities of the
past when the contribution made by women to the economic survival and growth of the family
was not recognized." Idem, p. 807.
78. R. v. Horseman, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901.
79. Idens, p. 907.
80. Rothfiemld v. Manolakos, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1259.
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owners, in the definition and evaluation of their legal relationship with
contractors and municipal authorities. 8'
In Towne Cinemai, an obscenity case, implicit in her opinion
seems to be the evaluation that the free marketing of sex, even on a
presumed consensual basis, has permitted some socially unacceptable
results, dehumanizing direct participants as well as viewers. The state
has therefore a role to play, protecting individual dignity as a matter of
collective interest.8 3
In the same vein, in Hess and Nguyena, a criminal case concerned
with a sexual offence, Judge Wilson seems to accept, in principle, the
legitimacy of state intervention to protect females under 14 years old
from the dangers inherent in premature sexual activity. Once again,
freedom and individual liberty are held to be potentially harmful.85
The Lavall6e86 case, sometimes referred to as the "battered wife
syndrome case", can be understood as another manifestation of Judge
Wilson's sensitivity to the reality that state intervention, including
through its judicial arm, can sometimes be made necessary by in-
equalities and injustices prevailing in the real and unregulated life of
the personal relationships, which is sometimes said to belong to the
realm of the sacred individual liberty. Indeed, she affirmed in that case
that the profound inequality and injustice arising from the situation of
battered women required a particular judicial intervention allowing
81. "We are dealing here with inexperienced owners seeking to have a retaining wall built on
their property and relying on the expertise of their contractors and on the watchdog function of
the city. Both let them down. I think it was perfectly reasonable for the plaintiffs to rely on the
city in that capacity particularly since it had issued a permit for the work to go ahead without any
advice to the plaintiffs that it, the city, was taking a calculated risk in doing so and that
subsequent on-site inspections were therefore absolutely vital." Idem, p. 1295.
82. Towne Cinema Theatres Ltd. v. R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 494.
83. "It seems to me that the undue exploitation of sex at which s. 159(8) is aimed is the treatment
of sex which in some fundamental way dehumanizes the persons portrayed and, as a consequence,
the viewers themselves. There is nothing wrong in the treatment of sex per se but there may be
something wrong in the manner of its treatment. Itmay be presented brutally, salaciously and in
a degrading manner, and would thus be dehumanizing and intolerable not only to the individuals
or groups who are victimized by it but to society at large. On the other hand, it may be presented
in a way which harms no one in that it depicts nothing more than non-violent sexual activity in
a manner which neither degrades or dehumanizes any particular individuals or groups. It is this
line between the mere portrayal of human sexual acts and the dehumanization of people that
must be reflected in the definition of "undueness"." Idem, p 523.
84. Hess and Nguyen, supra, note 19.
85. "I agree that s. 146(1) is designed to protect female children from premature sexual
intercourse and that this is a pressing and substantial concern. Very young girls who are made to
engage in sexual intercourse may suffer grave physical harm. No one can doubt that they may
suffer permanent psychological harm as a result of sexual intercourse at an unnaturally early age.
The first test in Oakes is therefore met." Idem, p. 920.
86. Lavallde, supra, note 27.
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for admissibility of expert evidence. That was made necessary by the
need to understand, beyond common and prejudiced first impression,
the very complex and socially constructed relationship between a
woman and her batterer partner. Ordinary legal rules were clearly
deficient to deal with that kind of situation.
From these cases, one gets a sense of Judge Wilson's preoccupa-
tion with a contextual notion of liberty, alive and well only if the state
not only respects it in a passive way, but protects and promotes it as
well in a positive way.
3. Unavoidable Burdens Imposed by the State
Individuals have therefore to emancipate themselves within a social
structure that imposes on them burdens which may be unavoidable in
a free and democratic society.
In Operation Dismantle"7 , Judge Wilson discussed the possible
burdens that have to be imposed on individuals in the context of a
national defence policy.
In Jones', she accepted that the state may have to impose some
burdens on freedom of religion. Not every trivial or unsubstantial
effect on religion, caused by legislative or administrative action, she
wrote, was to give rise to a constitutional freedom of religion issue.89
Judge Wilson warned against the trivialization of constitutional
guarantees that would ensue from the artificial protection against the
burdens that inevitably come with an organized social life. In Re B.C.
Motor Vehicle Act9 , the reference in which was discussed the consti-
tutionality of absolute responsibility offences matched with imprison-
ment, she clearly made the point:
It is true that the section prevents citizens from driving their vehicles
when their licences are suspended. Citizens are also prevented from
driving on the wrong side of the road. Indeed, all regulatory offences
impose some restriction on liberty broadly construed. But I think it
would trivialize the Charter to sweep all those offences into s.7 as
87. Operation Dismantle, supra, note 63.
88. Jones, supra, note 29.
89. "However, even assuming that this legislation does affect the appellant's beliefs, which for
the reasons given I doubt, not every effect of legislation on religious beliefs or practices is
offensive to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. Section 2(a) does not require the
legislature to refrain from imposing any burdens on the practice of religion. Legislative or
administrative action whose effect on religion is trivial or insubstantial is not, in my view, a
breach of freedom of religion. I believe that this conclusion necessarily follows from the
adoption of an effects-based approach to the Charter." Idem, p. 313-314.
90. Reference Re: B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.
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violations of the right to life, liberty and security of the person even if
they can be sustained under s.1. It would be my view, therefore, that
absolute liability offences of this type do not per se offend s.7 of the
Charter.91
In Thompson Newspapers92, she emphasized the necessity of gen-
eral regulatory schemes designed to organize human behaviour, and
contrasted these to real violations of liberty and security of the per-
son.
93
She acknowledged as well the imperfection of our system of jus-
tice. For example, in Mills94, in which the right to be tried within a
reasonable time was discussed, she accepted that the mere fact of
being charged brought with it important prejudice that even innocent
persons had to suffer, including anxiety, stress and stigmatization by
family and friends.95 But that was held to be part of living in an
organized society.96
She made the point again in Askov 97, a case concerned with the
same question, where she stated:
It is an inevitable consequence of our system of justice that innocent
people may from time to time be charged and suffer the social stigma of
the charge until their innocence is proved at trial. We accept this. We
cannot restore the accused to the status quo ante, much as we would
like to in these cases, but at least we can ensure that that period of
stigma is brought to an end as soon as is reasonably possible by the
91. Idem, p. 524.
92. Thompson Newspapers, supra, note 43.
93. "It is not necessary for me to attempt to determine the perimeters of "liberty" and "security
of the person". Clearly, they must be subject to some limits; otherwise any tenuous restriction
placed on an individual would constitute a violation of liberty and security of the person. There
is, however, in my view, a vast difference between a general regulatory scheme (such as the rules
of the road for motorists) designed to give some order to human behaviour and a state-imposed
compulsion on an individual to appear at proceedings against his will and testify on pain of
punishment if he refuses.: Idem, p. 460-461.
94. Mills v. R., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863.
95. Idem, p. 967.
96. "We should not, in other words, turn the presumption of innocence into a presumption of
Charter violation arising from the mere fact of the charge alone. To do so is to deny one of the
realities of the justice system, namely that it is not a perfect system and that persons who are
subsequently found to be innocent will, in the interval, have suffered the ignominy of the
process. The Charter does not purport to protect us against that. What it does guarantee
however, is that a person charged with an offence will not have to suffer that ignominy for an
unreasonable length of time before the charge against him is disposed of one way of the other.
At some point what was therefore lawful prejudice becomes unlawful and unconstitutional
delay." Idem, p. 968.
97. Askov, supra, note 50.
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guarantee of trial within a reasonable time so that the accused has the
opportunity to clear himself if he can."
The mere fact of living within an organized state therefore entails
everyday burdens that individuals have to bear. Beyond a mythical
image of liberty, it is simply a realistic aspect of it.
4. The Role of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
Thus individual freedom and dignity are fundamental, but life within a
community organized by a state necessarily implies some form of
limits on liberty. It is within that framework that the Charter must
operate: to allow the proper functioning of the Canadian democracy
while providing protection for the individual and collective rights that
it guarantees.
In McKinney v. University of Guelph", Judge Wilson made ex-
plicit, in these terms, the role of the Charter:
It seems to me that a historical review of the growth of the Canadian
state makes clear that those who enacted the Charter were concerned to
provide some protection for individual freedom and personal autonomy
in the face of government's expanding role. I do not think they
intended to do this by carving out or preserving "private" spheres of
activity. I believe, however, that they considered it crucial to establish
norms by which government would be constrained in performing the
many roles it has assumed and will no doubt continue to assume. They
sought to do this by setting out basic constitutional norms rooted in a
concern for individual dignity and autonomy which government should
be compelled to respect when structuring important aspects of citizens'
lives. The purpose of the Charter then, it seems to me, is to ensure that
government action that affects the citizen satisfies these basic constitu-
tional norms.'0
There is therefore no question of a "private" sphere of activity that
would be outside the realm of state intervention. It is, rather, that the
Charter provides some standards that the Canadian interventionist
state must respect; standards devoted to the protection of human
dignity and autonomy.
In the Debot case 0 1, in a context of criminal procedure, Judge
Wilson clearly asserted that the Charter guarantees did not prevent
98. Idem, p. 1253.
99. McKinney, supra, note 15.
100. Idem, p. 357-358.
101. Debot, supra, note 50.
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state action, but, rather, that they circumscribed the exercise of coer-
cive power, this being one of the essential attributes of any organized
state.'0
Even in the Morgentaler'0 3 case, which could be seen as a parox-
ysm in the celebration of individual freedom against state action, one
finds in Judge Wilson's opinion some remarks to the effect that the
Charter does not isolate individual freedom from communal preoccu-
pations, but rather operates a democratic compromise:
The Charter is predicated on a particular conception of the place of the
individual in society. An individual is not a totally independent entity
disconnected from the society in which he or she lives. Neither, how-
ever, is the individual a mere cog in an impersonal machine in which
his or her values, goals and aspirations are subordinated to those of the
collectivity. The individual is a bit of both. The Charter reflects this
reality by leaving a wide range of activities and decisions open to
legitimate government control while at the same time placing limits on
the proper scope of that control.104
Hence, it is possible that only "individual decision-making in
matters of fundamental personal importance"'10 5 could in certain (but
not all) circumstances be beyond the reach of state intervention.
It would therefore seem, in the light of the above analysis, that
Judge Wilson, though a strong defender of individual autonomy and
liberty, acknowledges the importance of state intervention which in-
evitably entails limitations on both. Or rather, it could be put, in a
truer sense, this way: she wants to promote the kind of individual
liberty that is compatible with a life inside a community.
5. The Duty of the State to Respect Human Dignity
Exemplifying the realm of what appears to be her general conception
of an individual within a state, Judge Wilson constantly showed a real
concern for human dignity.
102. "I start with the proposition that a monopoly on the use of certain types of power is a sine
qua non of a a legitimate government and its agents. With few exceptions only the state can
detain persons against their will, enter homes without permission, forcibly subject some one to a
search, and send people to prison. The intrusiveness and coercive nature of these procedures
should not be underestimated. The legal rights guaranteed by the Charter are designed inter alia
to circumscribe these coercive powers of the state within the boundaries of justice and fairness to
the individual. They are the most formidable defences the individual can marshall against
abuses of state power." Idem, p. 1172-1173.
103. Morgentaler, supra, note 32.
104. Idem, p. 164.
105. Idem, p. 170.
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In the Stoffman't 6 case, for example, in a context of alleged dis-
crimination, she expressed the view that people should be treated as
the individuals they really are, rather than according to generalizations
made on the basis of their colour or race, for example. This is
demanded by respect for human dignity 1 7
In R. v. Hess and Nguyen"~, reported in 1990, Judge Wilson
explained her preoccupation regarding the necessity of some form of
guilty mind, in the context of criminal liability. For her, respect for
human dignity and sense of worth forbid the imprisonment of a
morally innocent person.1t 9
She rejects the utilitarian conception to the effect that punishing
the innocent can be the price to pay for the achievement of higher
social values : human dignity, in a free and democratic society, re-
quires that individuals not be treated as means to an end." 0
One finds similar considerations about human dignity in S.D.GM.R.
v. Saskatchewan"', where Wilson J., in a dissenting opinion, associ-
ates free negotiations, in the context of labour law, with dignity of the
workers:
Free negotiation is valued because it enables workers to participate in
establishing their own working conditions. It is an exercise in self-
government and enhances the dignity of the worker as a person. 112
Finally, her discussion of undue exploitation of sex, in Towne
Cinema"', shows the same kind of preoccupation with moral dignity
106. Stoffinan, supra, note 51.
107. "In discrimination claims of the kind involved here, if the guarantee of equality is to mean
anything, it must at least mean this: that wherever possible an auempt be made to break free of
the apathy of stereotyping and that we make a sincere effort to treat all individuals, whatever
their colour, race, sex or age, as individuals deserving of recognition on the basis of their unique
talents and abilities. Respect for the dignity of every member of society demands no less." Idem,
p. 29.
108. Hess and Nguyen, supra, note 19.
109. "Our commitment to the principle that those who did not intend to commit harm and who
took all reasonable precautions to ensure that they did not commit an offence should not be
imprisoned stems from an acute awareness that to imprison a "mentally innocent" person is to
infict a grave injury on that person!s dignity and sense of worth" dem, p. 918.
110. "1 noted in connection with my s.7 analysis that the criminal law has come to recognize that
punishing the mentally innocent with a view to advancing particular objectives is fundamentally
unfair. It is to use the innocent as a means to an end. While utilitarian reasoning may at one time
have been acceptable, it is my view that when we are dealing with the potential for life
imprisonment it has no place in a free and democratic society:' Idem, p. 923-924.
111. SD.G.M.R. v. Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.
112. Idem, p. 486-487.
113. Towne Cinema, supra, note 82.
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of individuals. Nothing is wrong with sex, but some treatment of it is
dehumanizing, threatening at the same time the dignity of the immedi-
ate victims and that of the population at large.1 14
Judge Wilson accepts that if individual liberty must sometimes be
shaped by state intervention, it must always be done with a real
preoccupation for human dignity. The latter is, for her, a real concern.
6. The Duty of the State to Treat the Individual with Justice
1. GENERAL APPROACH
One finds in Judge Wilson's work a pervasive preoccupation with
the notion of justice and the necessary fairness essential in any rela-
tionship between the individual and the state.
She showed, for example, great respect for the presumption of
innocence, as a means to treat individuals with fairness. 15
In Thompson"6 , she denounced the unfairness of the "massive
violations of the rights of third parties to be free from unreasonable
searches" 7 guaranteed by the Charter, which inevitably flowed from
the tapping of public pay phones. Therefore, she required the authori-
zation of such tapping to be expressly granted." 8
In Huntv. Carey19, Judge Wilson insisted on the importance of the
right to present and defend one's case in a court of justice."
It is interesting to consider Air Canada v. B.C.12 1, a case in which
Judge Wilson, once again, strongly argued for protection of individu-
als against what she considered to be unjust treatment. In that case the
right of the state to recover moneys collected under an unconstitu-
tional law was discussed. She vehemently opposed the recognition of
such a right since it would have imposed an undue burden on citizens
114. Idem, p. 523, quoted above, note 83.
115. In Chaulk, supra, note 17, for example, one finds the following, at p. 3: "The presumption
of innocence has traditionally been viewed as the cornerstone of our criminal justice system. It
is reflected in the axiom that "It is better that a guilty person go free than that an innocent person
be convicted of a crime"."
116. Thompson, supra, note 44.
117. Idem, p. 1156.
118. "[..]any violation of the rights of third parties to be free from unreasonable searches should
be expressly authorized and not arise by implication or by the polie exercising a discretion
which can only be appropriately exercised by the authorizing judge." Idem, p. 1157.
119. Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959.
120. "As in England, if there is a chance that the plaintiff might succeed then the plaintiff should
not be driven from the judgment seat. Neither the length and complexity of the issues, the
novelty of the cause of action, nor the potential for the defendant to present a strong defence
should prevent the plaintiff from proceeding with his or her case." dei, p. 980.
121. Air Canada v. B.C., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1161.
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to first check the constitutionality of a tax law before making any
payment.'2
Moreover, she insisted on the fact that there was no reason for an
individual taxpayer, as opposed to the entire population, to pay for the
constitutional mistake made by the state. No policy reasons were
strong enough, she wrote, to justify that courts should go out of their
way to protect the government against its own actions. With an obvi-
ous passion dedicated to justice, she wrote:
Based on the foregoing reasoning I conclude that payments made under
a statute subsequently found to be unconstitutional should be recover-
able and I cannot, with respect, accept my colleague's proposition that
the principle should be reversed for policy reasons in the case of
payments made to governmental bodies. What is the policy that re-
quires such a dramatic reversal of principle? Why should the indi-
vidual taxpayer, as opposed to taxpayers as a whole, bear the burden of
government's mistake? I would respectfully suggest that it is grossly
unfair that X, who may not be (as in this case) a large corporate
enterprise, should absorb the cost of government's unconstitutional act.
If it is appropriate for the courts to adopt some kind of policy in order
to protect government against itself (and I cannot say that the idea
particularly appeals to me) it should be one which distributes the loss
fairly across the public. The loss should not fall on the totally innocent
taxpayer whose only fault is that it paid what the legislature improperly
said was due. I find it quite ironic to describe such a person as
"asserting a right to disrupt the government by demanding a refund" or
"creating fiscal chaos" or "requiring a new generation to pay for the
expenditures of the old". By refusing to adopt such a policy the courts
are not "visiting the sins of the fathers on the children". The "sin" in
this case (if it can be so described) is that of government and only
government has means available to it to protect against the conse-
quences of it. It should not, in my opinion, be done by the courts and
certainly not at the expense of individual taxpayers.12
Judge Wilson's preoccupation with fairness in the relationship
between the individual and the state found some expression in cases in
which she insisted on some right to information, for the population in
general, as well as for individuals in particular.
122. "It would be my view that the mistake of law doctrine (if it is to be retained) should
certainly not be extended to moneys paid under unconstitutional legislation. Otherwise taxpayers
will be obliged to check out the constitutional validity of taxing legislation before they pay their
taxes in pain of being unable to recover anything paid under unconstitutional laws. In my
opinion, this is to place the onus of inquiry as to constitutionality in the wrong place." Idem, p.
1214.
123. Idem, p. 1215.
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One remembers Mackeigan v. Hickman'24, a case concerned with
judicial immunity and in which she showed, in a dissenting opinion, a
real concern for the right of the community to know what is going on
in the judicial arm of the state. She stated that there could be cases
where public interest would be better served by public scrutiny than
by strict protection of the principle of judicial immunity.
When there is a real risk that judicial immunity may be perceived by
the public as being advanced for the protection of the judiciary rather
than for the protection of the justice system, the public interest in my
view requires that the question be asked and answered.as
In the criminal law setting, Judge Wilson often insisted on the
necessity of the accused to have the benefit of proper information,
before having to make a decision. 126
Finally, some remarks Judge Wilson made in the Towne Cinema'27
case show a great concern for fairness in the dealings between the
state and the individual. In that case, it takes the form of a preoccupa-
tion that the individual be given the proper information in order to be
able to answer the case made against him. Indeed, in the case of undue
exploitation of sex, she insisted on the fact that the burden imposed on
the Crown to establish obscenity beyond a reasonable doubt included
the burden to prove both the community standard of acceptability and
its non-respect by the accused. She refused to take judicial notice of
the former. She made clear that the accused had the right to know the
case he had to meet, in order to be able to present a full defence.
Judicial notice, if possible at all, would here have caused prejudice to
the accused.12'
124. MacKenzie v. Hickman, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 796.
125. Idem, p. 808-809.
126. See, for example: R. v. Black, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 138 at 152-153; R. v.Lyons, [1987] 2 S.C.R.
309 at 379-380; Clarlon v. R., [1986] 1 S.C.R. 383 at 394; R. v. Farrault, [19831 1 S.C.R. 124
at 127-128.
127. Towne Cinema, supra, note 82.
128. "Having regard to the fact that the onus is on the Crown to establish obscenity beyond a
reasonable doubt, it seems to me that the onus is on it to establish both what the community
standard of acceptability is and that the accused has gone beyond it. The accused may counter
the Crown's evidence of the community standard with evidence of its own and the Judge may
reach his decision on the evidence in the usual way. In my view it is naive to think that a judge,
drawing on his own experience alone, can determine the objective standard against which
impugned conduct is to measured. As Borins Co. Ct. J. said in R. v. Doug Rankine Co. (supra)
the legislature cannot credibly expect a trier of fact to have his finger on the "pornographic pulse
of the nation". Moreover, it is wrong in principle. It leaves the accused with no way of knowing
the case it has to meet, at what level of acceptability the line will be drawn by any particular
judge. There is no certainty. It is the length of the Chancellor's foot imported into the criminal
law." Idem, p. 529.
The Individual in Judge Wilson's Work
2. A SUBJECrVIST APPROACH TO CRINNAL LAW
Judge Wilson's concern with the duty of the state to treat the
individual with justice finds a particular expression in her strong
defense of a subjectivist approach to criminal law. Indeed, she strongly
believes in the principle that criminal responsibility should be entailed
only by those with some sort of a guilty mind.
In Hess and Nguyen129, a case concerning the constitutionality of a
Criminal Code provision prohibiting a sexual conduct and making
irrelevant the knowledge of one element of the offence, i.e. the age of
the victim, she considered the history of mens rea. She explained that
it revealed a progressive concern for the injustice of punishing the
morally innocent, a recognition of the uselessness of deterrence absent
some culpable mind' 30, and an abandonment of the purely retributive
element of punishment.
In my view, the history of the doctrine of mens rea shows a gradual
move away from a purely retributive conception of punishment, where
the law sought to pay back the moral evil done without regard for the
reasons why the actor committed the prohibited act, to a conception of
punishment that is not only sensitive to injustice involved in punishing
those who are mentally innocent but also takes account of the fact that
punishment will not act as an effective deterrent if persons are punished
who did not know or could not have known that they were committing
an offence. 31
For Judge Wilson, the requirement of mens rea seems to rest
ultimately on the necessary respect, by the state, for the inherent
dignity of the individual."
In Tutton"', a criminal negligence case, she related the require-
ment of some sort of guilty mind as a condition of penal liability to the
principles of fundamental justice."4
In Docherty13., she affirmed that knowledge that what one was
committing was a criminal offence constituted a necessary element of
129. Hess and Nguyen, supra, note 19.
130. See also, to the same effect: R. v. Docherty, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 941 at 951: "Put simply, it
makes little sense to think that a person will be deterred from wrongdoing in situations where
that person does not believe and has no awareness that he or she is doing anything wrong:'
131. Hess and Nguyen, supra, note 19, p. 917-918.
132. Idem, p. 918, quoted above, note 109.
133. R. v. Tuton, [19891 1 S.C.R. 1392.
134. "This Court made clear in Sault Ste. Marie and other cases that the imposition of criminal
liability in the absence of proof of a blameworthy state of mind, either as an inference from the
nature of the act committed or by other evidence, is an anomaly which does not sit comfortably
with the principles of penal liability and fundamental justice [...]. Idem, p. 1401-1402.
135. Docherty, supra, note 130.
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the offence of wilfully breaching one's probation order through the
commission of a criminal offence. The importance of a subjective
knowledge of every component of an offence was considered so
fundamental as to justify an exception to the general inadmissibility of
a defence of ignorance of law 36
In the same vein, Judge Wilson's commitment to a subjectivist
approach to criminal law modeled her interpretation of statutory lan-
guage. In Tutton 37, for example, she interpreted the criminal negli-
gence offence created by the Criminal Code as requiring a mental
element of advertence or awareness of the created risk, beyond a mere
objective gross negligence. 13 She clearly made the point that, should
policy reasons argue in favour of an objective standard, it was Parlia-
ment's responsibility to decide this, and that the Courts would not do
so through statutory interpretation.
Should social protection require the adoption of an objective standard it
is open to Parliament to enact a law which clearly adopts such a
standard. In my respectful view this Court should not do it for them.139
Within that general context, one can wonder why Judge Wilson
insisted on maintaining the rule that, in principle, intoxication was not
an admissible defence in the case of an accusation based on a general
intent offence. Indeed, more than once, she refused to overrule the
principle. In Penno'4°, for example, she confirmed that the rule was
justified on the ground that intoxication generally did not deprive a
person of the mere knowledge of what she was doing, which was the
only required intent. 4 '
In Bernard42, a sexual assault case, she made clear, moreover, that
"in most cases involving general intent offences and intoxication, the
Crown will be able to establish the accused's blameworthy mental
state by inference from his or her acts". 43
136. Idem, p. 960.
137. Tutton, supra, note 133.
138. Idem, p. 1406-14(7.
139. ldem, p. 1413-1414.
140. R. -v. Penrs, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 865.
141. "The rationale in support of this finding was that intoxication could affect a person's ability
to foresee the consequences of an act, which is a requirement for crimes of specific intent, but
that, generally speaking intoxication could not deprive a person of the ability to know that he or
she was committing the act which is the minimal requirement for crimes of general intent."
Idem, p. 887.
142. R. v. Bernard, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 833.
143. Idem, p. 882.
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However, still preserving her subjectivist approach, Judge Wilson
accepted the possibility that extreme intoxication could sometimes be
shown as negating even the minimal knowledge required by general
intent offences.
I view it as preferable to preserve the Leary rule in its more flexible
form as Pigeon J. applied it, i.e., so as to allow evidence of intoxication
to go to the trier of fact in general intent offences only if it is evidence
of extreme intoxication involving an absence of awareness akin to a
state of insanity or automatism. Only in such a case is the evidence
capable of raising a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the minimal
intent required for the offence. 1"
Her concem with a criminal justice system founded on the need for
a guilty mind in criminal offences prompted Judge Wilson to accept
that even unreasonable beliefs and mistakes of fact could repudiate
mens rea. In Tutton'45, for example, she made the point that to require
that mistakes be reasonable would permit the condemnation of some
innocent people, those, for example, who cannot be fairly expected to
live up to the standard of the reasonable person. 46
However, in Robertson47, a sexual assault case where a defence of
mistake of fact was presented, still accepting the admissibility of even
unreasonable mistakes of fact, Judge Wilson made clear that the
accused had to adduce sufficient evidence as to his honest belief, if he
wanted to put the defence in issue. 4 Moreover, she added:
There must be evidence which gives an air of reality to the defence of
mistake of fact before the court will consider it [... 1 '9
For Judge Wilson, it would seem, justice in the relationship be-
tween the individual and the state is the raison d'etre for the require-
ment of a guilty mind for criminal responsibility. If one accepts that
the state has the monopoly on legitimate coercion, it would simply not
be just for it to punish the morally innocent person.
From the foregoing one finds a sophisticated conception of the
individual. The person's dignity and liberty are fundamental. This will
144. Idem, p. 887.
145. Tutton, supra, note 133.
146. "To require, as does my colleague, that all misperceptions be reasonable will, in my view,
not excuse many of those who through no fault of their own cannot fairly be expected to live up
to the standard of the reasonable person." Iden, p. 1417.
147. R. v. Robertson, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 918.
148. Ident, p. 936.
149. Idem, p. 939.
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sometimes require some passive respect from the state, and some
other times a more active protection against interference by other
individuals. But when the state intervenes, it must always do so with
justice and with respect for human dignity.
III. A Gendered Individual
It is impossible to have a proper image of the individual in the work of
Judge Wilson without addressing the issue of gender relationships.
Indeed, it seems to have been an important preoccupation of hers, and
she has had the opportunity to explain some of her views on the
matter.
It would seem to me that the ad hoc impressions and opinions she
expressed on the subject are quite consistent. I think she would agree
that historically gender relationships have been ones of domination.
Women's lack of power, be it economic, political or institutional,
prevented us from participating in the elaboration of the world, and of
ideas about the world. We were not involved in the creation of legal
concepts and our particular viewpoint has therefore not been taken
into account.uo It is therefore time for women to take their place in
society generally, and in the legal domain in particular.
Obviously, one first thinks of Judge Wilson's speech on the impact
of the presence of women judges.' Therein, she referred to sexist
stereotypes within the legal field. For example, she explained how
prejudices about women's sexuality have modeled some aspects of the
criminal law. She wrote about the possibility of women having a
different voice, and about the importance of that different voice being
heard, from then on.
And she, for sure, let a different voice be heard.
In that respect, her opinion in the Morgentaler case' 52 is a funda-
mental one. In that case, Judge Wilson has proved herself to be
courageous and powerful. Discussing the constitutionality of the
Criminal Code provisions providing for the principle of criminalization
of abortion, in the light of women's constitutional rights, she made
assertions essential to women's rights generally. She first made clear
that the decision by a woman to continue or not a pregnancy was a
150. In the Morgentaler case, supra, note 32, at p. 170, Judge Wilson referred to "the subjective
elements of the female psyche", to women's "special place in the societal structure" and to
"biological distinctions between the two sexes."
151. Wilson, Judge Bertha, loc. cit., supra, note 3.
152. Morgentaler, supra, note 32.
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most important and intimate one, and that the state's interest in the
protection of the foetus could only be exercised in the respect of
women's rights to liberty and security. She acknowledged the fact that
human rights struggles have until now mainly been concerned with
rights of human beings in general, and that women's rights were
sometimes unique, and forgotten.153 As regards abortion, one remem-
bers how provocative she was by asserting that:
It is probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively, to
such a dilemma not just because it is outside the realm of his personal
experience (although this is, of course, the case) but because he can
relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating the subjective
elements of the female psyche which are at the heart of the dilemma.' -
But too much emphasis has been put on this particular sentence. I
don't think she in any way was positing some kind of irreconcilability
between men and women. I would rather understand what she said as
founded on a vision implying that men and women live fundamentally
different realities, and have to work towards a better mutual under-
standing, but cannot take this understanding for granted.
In the Lavallie case 55 as well, Judge Wilson acknowledged the
difficulty of the relationship between genders, the existence of preju-
dices and myths to be destroyed, and the necessity for the law to take
into account those social realities. In that case, the admissibility of
expert evidence as regards the "battered wife syndrome" was in issue.
Since self-defence is based on the establishment of a reasonable
apprehension of death, the Court had to decide whether, in the case of
a battered woman, the determination of that apprehension was a mat-
ter for the layperson's common sense to decide, or whether it necessi-
tated here expert evidence to be admitted. Judge Wilson went for the
latter. Here again, she wrote an important opinion. She first acknowl-
edged the existence, "[t]he gravity, indeed, the tragedy of domestic
violence". 56 Coming from a Supreme Court of Canada Justice, it was
a rather important and meaningful affirmation. She added:
Greater media attention to this phenomenon in recent years has re-
vealed both its prevalence and its horrific impact on women from all
walks of life. 157
153. Iderm, p. 170.
154. Idenm p. 170.
155. Lavalie, supra, note 27.
156. Iden, p. 872-873.
157. Idem.
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She accepted that the law had not been neutral as regards the
problem, but that it had even sanctioned domestic violence. 58 Deeply
entrenched in the social setting, the law had simply showed to be in
tune with real world relationships.
Laws do not spring out of social vacuum. The notion that a man has a
right to "discipline" his wife is deeply rooted in the history of our
society. The woman's duty was to serve her husband and to stay in the
marriage at all costs "till death do us part" and to accept as her due any
"punishment" that was meted out for failing to please her husband.
One consequence of this attitude was that "wife battering" was rarely
spoken of, rarely reported, rarely prosecuted, and even more rarely
punished. Long after society abandoned its formal approval of spousal
abuse tolerance of it continued and continues in some circles to this
day.159
Because of this historical background, the average person is not
sensitive to the complex pattern of relationship giving rise to domestic
violence.160 The woman is easily thought to be lying or masochistic.
Because, as regards domestic violence, myths and stereotypes are well
and alive.
The average member of the public (or of the jury) can be forgiven for
asking: Why would a woman put up with this kind of treatment? Why
should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a
partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We
would expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-
respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself?.
Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called
"battered wife syndrome".'61
Judge Wilson therefore admitted the importance of expert evi-
dence allowing to go beyond prejudice, and toward a better under-
standing of the complex relationship involved in the case.
One cannot be surprised to find in Judge Wilson's work a gendered
individual. Her contextual approach so required; the individual could
not have been taken apart from her context, where gender is such a
fundamental feature.
158. Idem, pp. 872-873.
159. Idem, pp. 872-873.
160. Idem, pp. 872-873.
161. Idem, p. 871-872.
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IV. Some Other Characteristics of the Individual
The individual one finds in Judge Wilson's work is complex and
presents numerous characteristics, some of which will briefly be pre-
sented here.
1. An Individual Responsible for Her Choices
One finds in Judge Wilson's work a conception of an individual with
the capacity to make choices, obviously, but at the same time respon-
sible for those choices.
In Kosmopoulos'62, an insurance case, for example, Judge Wilson
reminded that the person choosing incorporation for the pursuance of
certain activities had to reconcile himself with the burdens that come
with that choice.163
In Pelech v. Pelech1", a divorce case, she made a similar argu-
ment, but in a somewhat more emotionally charged context. In that
case, the issue was the responsibility of a person as regards an ex-
spouse's difficult financial situation, long after a divorce, and com-
pletely outside the scope of an agreement freely entered into by both
partners. Judge Wilson decided that the terms of the agreement had to
be respected, and affirmed that "people should be encouraged to take
responsibility for their own lives and their own decisions". 6
She wrote that "parties who have declared their relationship at an
end should be taken at their word". 16  In a way, she insisted that, in
principle, a terminated marital relationship should not continue to
have effects for the rest of the life of the former spouses.167 They had
to have the possibility to start a new life without the threat of a
162. Kosmopoulos v. Constitution Insurance Co., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2.
163. "Mr. Kosmopoulos was advised by a competent solicitor to incorporate his business in
order to protect his personal assets and there is nothing in the evidence to indicate that his
decision to secure the benefits of incorporation was not a genuine one. Having chosen to receive
the benefits of incorporation, he should not be allowed to escape its burdens. He should not be
permitted to "blow hot and cold" at the same time." Idem, p. 11.
164. Pelech v. Pelech, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 801.
165. "It seems to me that where the parties have negotiated their own agreement, freely and on
the advice of independent legal counsel, as to how their financial affairs should be settled on the
breakdown of their marriage, and the agreement is not unconscionable in the substantive law
sense, it should be respected. People should be encouraged to take responsibility for their own
lives and their own decisions. This should be the overriding policy consideration." Idem, p. 850.
166. Iderm, pp. 851-852.
167. She mentioned an exception for the case wherre the radical change in the situation of the
former spouse is "the result of a pattern of economic dependency generated by the marriage
relationship": see Richardson v. Richardson, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 857 at 866.
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Damocl~s sword constantly hanging over their heads. Judge Wilson
preferred individual liberty over "a fiction of marital responsibility":
While I realize that Mrs. Pelech's present hardship is great, to burden
the respondent with her care fifteen years after their marriage has ended
for no other reason than that they were once husband and wife seems to
me to create a fiction of marital responsibility at the expense of indi-
vidual responsibility.16s
Consequently, subsequent financial hardship of a person is a mat-
ter for the "communal responsibility of the state"169, rather than for the
ex-spouse.
2. An Individual who Communicates with Others
Judge Wilson views the individual as communicating with others. She
therefore considers language as fundamentally important, as a way of
shaping as much as of expressing ideas. Adding these premises to the
Canadian political history, she acknowledges the importance of lan-
guage rights, underlying the importance of communicating and of
being understood.
It starts from the premise that the essence of language is communica-
tion and that implicit in the notion of language rights in the context of
court proceedings is the ability both to understand and to be under-
stood. If this is correct, it is clearly not enough that the litigant has the
right to use his or her language if those dealing with him or her are
using a different language. Indeed the specific and often urgent neces-
sity of clear communication in the course of litigation is a feature of the
fundamentally social function of language.170
3. An Ordinary Individual
Probably because of her general commitment to a contextual approach
centered around particular circumstances, one does not find, in Judge
Wilson's work, an abstractly defined and typified image of the indi-
vidual. On the contrary, from one case to another, one finds a very
ordinary person: a free person that legitimately can say sometimes
yes and sometimes no to sexual encounter171; a person that can be
168. Pelech, supra, note 164, p. 852-853.
169. Idem, p. 852.
170. MacDonald v. Ville de Montrial, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 460, 523-524. See also: Socthig des
Acadiens v. Association of Parents, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 549.
171. See R. v. Konkin, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 388at 398-399: "There is no doubt that at this stage the
trial Judge was in effect saying to counsel: Why is post-offence sexual conduct relevant? Prima
facie it doesn't appear to me to be so. How can sexual conduct the complainant engaged in after
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tempted to take advantage of the self-reporting tax system172; a person
who is not legally versed 73; a frail person 74; one with a commendable
sense of initiative 75; or a rather well-informed person.176 As we have
seen in Lavallge'", Judge Wilson's individual is well integrated in a
social context that models her way of thinking, and therefore may hold
prejudices and stereotypes.
Conclusion
It is difficult to conclude such a paper. One does not want to betray, in
the offence tell us anything about her credibility as a witness or whether she consented to have
intercourse with this particular accused in relation to this particular offence?"; and at 401-402:
"[...]it would not in my view effect a "balancing" of the interests of the complainant and the
accused to permit him to lead a humiliating and devasting inquiry at trial into post-offence sexual
conduct of the complainant that would clearly have been inadmissible prior to the enactment of
the section. Accordingly, while post-offence sexual conduct is not inadmissible per se, it should
only in my view be admitted where its relevance to a fact in issue has been established. The trial
Judge himself gave an example of how this might be done, namely if it were shown that pre- and
post- offence sexual conduct formed a continuous pattem. He did not exclude the post-offence
conduct per se. He excluded it because it did not cross the first hurdle of being relevant to a fact
in issue in the case."
172. See R. v. McKinlay Transport Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R., 627 at 637: "Nonetheless, it would be
naive to think that no one attempts to take advantage of the self-reporting system in order to
avoid paying his or her full share of the tax burden by violating the rules set forth in the Act."
173. See R. v. Stevens, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1153 at 1181: "Is McLachlin J.A. correct in suggesting
that absolute liability is rationally connected to the objective of deterrence? In my view, if there
is a connection, it is a somewhat tenuous one. The leamed Justice's thesis seems to be based on
the assumption that an individual contemplating sexual intercourse with a female who appears to
him to be over 14 first addresses his mind to the men rea requirement of a fairly obscure section
of the Code. In my view, this ascribes an unrealistically high degree of legal sophistication to the
average accused."
174. See Racine v. Woods, supra, note 74, p. 185, quoted above, note 75.
175. See Abrahans v. A.G. Canada, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 2 at 9: "One might ask what comparable
wrong was the legislature seeking to remedy in para.(c). The Federal Court of Appeal says it was
trying to prevent claimants from taking other occupations during a strike with the intention of
returning to their original employment after the strike was over. But what is wrong with this?
Why would the legislature seek to discourage it? Perhaps such persons should be commended,
not penalized, for their initiative. I have concluded that again what the legislature was seeking to
deter was some sort of fraud on the Commission. A "token" engagement in another occupation
should not have the effect of restoring benefits. Ithas to be a "regular" job and not just a day or
two here and there with no firm commitment by either the claimant or the new employer. The
legislative purpose in inserting the adverbial qualifications into both these paragraphs was, in my
view, to protect against abused under the section."
176. See R. v. BiLand, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398 at 426: "I question whether the fear that the
polygraph operator will usurp the role of the jury is wellfounded. Juries of today are much more
sophisticated than they were when some of our restrictive rules of evidence were developed.
They are well versed in modem technology, thanks to the influence of the mass media, and are
not today in awe of scientific evidence as they might have been a hundred or even fifty years
ago.
177. Lavalle, supra, note 27.
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a few words, a complex intellectual work. Nonetheless, let me just say
that I could easily live with the kind of individual I found depicted in
Judge Wilson's work. She is free and autonomous, has the right to
know, is capable of making choices but must live with the conse-
quences even if they are burdens. She is not alone, she is not isolated.
She lives within a community that made her who she is but which she
can transform. She lives with others, within an organized state, within
which there is no liberty without law. The state can, and ought to,
intervene, but there are ways it can do so and ways it can not. And this
stems from the fact that justice and dignity must be respected.
This individual is a gendered one, and, historically, women were at
a disadvantage within gender relationships. But things have started to
change. Judge Wilson has courageously accomplished a great deal
towards attainment of this change. And we should all be thankful for
that. But more courage is still needed.
